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11 Abstract
12 Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on monetary
13 policy. However, this has been complicated by the fact that transparency is a qualitative concept that is hard
14 to measure. This paper proposes an index for the transparency of monetary policy that comprises the
15 political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking. The index is compiled
16 for nine major central banks. It is based on a detailed analysis of actual information disclosure and reveals a
17 rich variety in the degree and dynamics of central bank transparency.
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21
22 1. Introduction
23 Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on
24 monetary policy. The public demands transparency to achieve accountability of central banks
25 that have increasingly become independent. In addition, a burgeoning academic literature has
26 analyzed the economic consequences of greater transparency of monetary policy. The debate on
27 transparency has been complicated by the fact that it is a qualitative concept for which few
28 measures exist. This paper proposes an index for the transparency of monetary policy that
29 comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking.
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33 The index is compiled for nine major central banks for 5 years (1998–2002) and is based on a
34 scrutiny of actual information disclosure. It reveals the various ways in which central banks have
35 become transparent and how transparency is evolving over time.
36 To give a sneak preview of our findings, the most transparent central banks in our sample are
37 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England. The subtop
38 is formed by the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. The least
39 transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss
40 National Bank. Although the most transparent central banks are all inflation targeters, this
41 monetary policy framework appears neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
42 transparency.
43 An important advantage of our transparency index is that it is based on a theory-consistent
44 framework and distinguishes various aspects of transparency based on the role that information
45 plays in the monetary decision making process. This makes our index better suited to test
46 predictions from the theoretical literature. In addition, it allows us to identify how central banks
47 differ in their emphasis of various aspects, independent of their monetary policy framework, and
48 how greater transparency manifests itself over time.
49 There are several other papers that provide useful descriptions of central bank transparency in
50 practice. Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) provide a well structured description in
51 the form of case studies but focus their analysis on inflation targeting. An elaborate informal
52 discussion and review of central bank transparency is presented by Blinder, Goodhart,
53 Hildebrand, Lipton, and Wyplosz (2001). They give a detailed account of transparency at the
54 Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the
55 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, but do not provide any measure for the degree of transparency.
56 In their comprehensive survey of 94 central banks, Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne
57 (2000) construct an index of dpolicy explanationsT that consists of three components: (i)
58 explanations of policy decisions, (ii) explanations in forecasts and forward-looking analysis, and
59 (iii) explanations in published assessments and research. Their index captures many transparency
60 issues, but does not highlight the role of information in the decision-making process. In addition,
61 their index is constructed using survey responses from central banks, whereas our results stem
62 from an independent analysis of the actual information disclosed by central banks.
63 In addition, Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) present an indicator of central bank transparency
64 and accountability for six major central banks that captures four components: objectives,
65 strategy, publication of data and forecasts, and communication strategy.
1 The latter captures
66 diversity in the medium of information disclosure, regardless of how informative the disclosures
67 are. In contrast, our transparency index focuses on the contents of information disclosure.
68 Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003) evaluate the inflation reports of 20 central banks that
69 have adopted inflation targeting. They assess the quantity, quality and accessibility of the
70 information provided, the clarity of assumptions about key macroeconomic variables, the
71 presentation of the policy-making process, and the executive summary. In addition, they provide
72 an overall rating of each inflation report based on its persuasiveness, expertise, completeness,
73 writing style and information. Their analysis considers many facets of communication but is
74 confined to inflation reports. Instead, our index focuses on the informativeness about each stage
75 of the policymaking process and covers all public communication by central banks.
1 de Haan and Amtenbrink (2002) suggest a variation on this index. In addition, de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger
(1999) provide an index of central bank accountability that includes some elements that pertain to transparency.
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76 Last but not least, we are the first to provide a monetary policy transparency index that
77 covers several years (1998–2002). It reveals interesting dynamics and establishes that
78 transparency has increased considerably for several central banks but not in all respects.
79 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the conceptual
80 framework that is used to motivate our index of central bank transparency, which is presented in
81 Section 3. The index is used in Section 4 to show how transparent central banks are. Section 5
82 provides a critical discussion of the results and Section 6 concludes.
83 2. Conceptual framework
84 Transparency of monetary policy can be defined as the extent to which central banks
85 disclose information that is related to the policymaking process. It is a multifaceted concept
86 that could pertain to any aspect of monetary policymaking. Thus, it seems natural to use a
87 conceptual framework that reflects the different stages of the decision-making process.
88 Following Geraats (2002), one can distinguish five aspects of transparency: political,
89 economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. These aspects of transparency
90 correspond to information disclosure about the stages of monetary policymaking illustrated in
91 Fig. 1.
92
93 ! Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a statement
94 of the formal objectives of monetary policy, including an explicit prioritization in case of
95 potentially conflicting goals, and quantitative targets. Political transparency is enhanced by
96 institutional arrangements, like central bank independence and central bank contracts,
97 because they ensure that there is no undue influence or political pressure to deviate from
98 stated objectives.
2
99 ! Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary
100 policy. This includes the economic data the central bank uses, the policy models it employs to
101 construct economic forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts
102 the central bank relies on. The latter are particularly important since monetary policy actions
103 are known to take effect only after substantial lags. So, the central bank’s actions are likely to
104 reflect anticipated developments.
105 ! Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It involves an
106 explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy framework, and
107 an account of the actual policy deliberations and how the policy decision was reached, which
108 is achieved by the release of minutes and voting records.
109 ! Policy transparency means a prompt announcement of policy decisions. In addition, it
110 includes an explanation of the decision and a policy inclination or indication of likely future
111 policy actions. The latter is relevant because monetary policy actions are typically made in
112 discrete steps; a central bank may be inclined to change the policy instrument, but decide to
113 wait until further evidence warrants moving a full step.
114 ! Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions. It
115 involves a discussion of control errors in achieving the operating instrument or target set in
2 Note that political transparency need not be under control of the central bank, but is often determined by political
authorities (government or legislature). For instance, Anglo-Saxon central banks typically do not have goal independence
and lack the ability to set their own quantitative targets.
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116 the policy decision, and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the
117 transmission of monetary policy from instrument to outcome.
3
118
119 It is useful to show how each of these aspects features in a canonical model. Consider a
120 central bank with the objective function
W ¼ ap   p4  2
þ b y   y4  2
ð1Þ
121 122 where p is inflation and y is output. An important component of political transparency is the
123 publication of the inflation target p
*.
4 In addition, institutional arrangements also matter because
124 they clarify the motives of monetary policymakers. In particular, central bank independence
125 ensures that central bankers can pursue (1) without political influence, and incentive schemes
126 effectively modify their objective function (1).
127 The structure of the economy could be represented by the aggregate demand and supply
128 equations
y ¼ y ¯ ¯   ai  pe   r ¯ ¯Þþd ðð 2Þ
129 p ¼ pe þ by   y ¯ ¯ ðÞ þ s ð3Þ
130 131 where i is the nominal interest rate and p
e denote inflation expectations.
5 The natural rate of
132 output is y ¯ and the long-run real interest rate equals r ¯. In addition, there are aggregate demand
133 shocks d and aggregate supply shocks s. Economic transparency means that the private sector
134 has the same knowledge about the economy as the central bank. This includes both the structure
135 of the economy and the part of the disturbances d and s that are anticipated by the central bank
136 and reflected in its actions.
6
137 Assume that the nominal interest rate i is used as monetary policy instrument. The
138 central bank could set it based on a Taylor-type instrument rule, or it could maxi-
139 mize (1) subject to (2) and (3), adopting a Svensson (2002) style targeting frame-work that
140 allows for judgement. Alternatively, the central bank could use different procedures and
141 formulate its own monetary policy strategy. In the case of procedural transparency, the central
142 bank’s strategy and other procedural aspects like minutes and voting records are shared with the
143 private sector.
144 In the context of the canonical model, policy transparency means that the central bank
145 promptly announces its decision about the policy instrument i. When interest rate movements are
146 restricted to discrete increments, a policy inclination is also relevant.
147 Finally, the implementation of monetary policy could be complicated by control errors
148 pertaining to the policy instrument, or transmission disturbances in the form of unanticipated
6 If the central bank’s behavior is not certainty-equivalent, uncertainty about the economy should be conveyed as well.
3 Another kind of operational transparency that could potentially be considered is the publication of money market
interventions that are made to implement policy decisions. However, this issue of market transparency is not included in
our transparency index which focuses more on macroeconomic aspects.
4 Perfect political transparency would require that the output target y
*, relative preferences a/b and the functional form
of the objective function are also known to the private sector, but in practice, no central banks are transparent in this
respect. See Cukierman (2002) for a discussion and potential explanation.
5 The structure of the economy determines the transmission mechanism. Cukierman (2002) provides a comparison of
three popular models: neo-monetarist Lucas-type transmission, the neo-Keynesian model with backward-looking pricing,
and the new-Keynesian model with forward-looking pricing.
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149 aggregate demand and supply shocks d and s. Operational transparency means that these control
150 errors and transmission disturbances are communicated to the public.
151 This stylized model shows that all five aspects of our conceptual framework can be
152 distinguished in theory and that each is required for an adequate analytical description of
153 monetary policy. Our index, which is presented in Section 3, provides a way to quantify central
154 bank transparency for each of these five aspects. Of course, the construction of any index reflects
155 some subjective choices. We decided to distinguish the different aspects of transparency to focus
156 on the role of information in the decision process of the central bank. This makes our index
157 closer to the theoretical literature and more amenable to an empirical evaluation of transparency
158 models than existing indices.
159 In principle, the motives for and effects of transparency could differ for each of the five
160 aspects (see the survey by Geraats (2002)). Theoretical arguments indicate that political,
161 economic and operational transparency could enhance credibility of low-inflation monetary
162 policy, procedural transparency may improve the quality of decision-making, and policy
163 transparency could boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. The fact that some aspects of
164 transparency could have a similar effect suggests that there may be some degree of
165 substitutability. However, the theoretical literature shows that such substitutability is not
166 straightforward. For instance, Geraats (2005) finds that economic transparency improves the
167 central bank’s incentives to invest in reputation and leads to lower inflation, but that greater
168 transparency about preferences has the opposite effect. Ultimately, the relevance of (aspects of)
169 transparency is an empirical matter that our index may help to resolve.
170 It is important to emphasize that greater transparency may not be desirable. The
171 comprehensive survey by Geraats (2002) explains the great variety of theoretical findings in
172 the literature, depending on the aspect considered and the structure of the model.
7 For example,
173 transparency about supply shocks is detrimental when it affects the contemporaneous aggregate
174 supply equation, because it hampers output stabilization. Furthermore, the public announcement
175 of noisy information (e.g. a highly uncertain future interest rate path) could lead to greater
176 variability and reduce social welfare when agents discard private information to coordinate their
177 actions (Morris and Shin, 2002). However, the theoretical literature has also identified potential
178 benefits of transparency. In particular, it could lead to lower inflation and enhance the central
179 bank’s reputation; it may give the central bank greater flexibility to stabilize economic shocks
180 and reduce the volatility of output; it reduces private sector uncertainty; and it allows for greater
181 accountability which makes it possible to align the actions of central bankers closer to socially
182 optimal monetary policy.
183 Although many central banks have become remarkably transparent during the last decade, the
184 question whether transparency is always beneficial is still an open issue. Empirical research is
185 needed to evaluate the relevance of the theoretical arguments advanced in the literature, but that
186 requires a theory-consistent measure of transparency, which we provide.
187 3. Central bank transparency index
188 The degree of transparency could be measured by analyzing either formal disclosure
189 requirements or actual practices. This paper pursues the latter approach because the information
190 disclosure by central banks tends to go far beyond legal requirements. The public
7 See also the interesting informal discussions by Goodfriend (1986) and Winkler (2002).
S.C.W. Eijffinger, P.M. Geraats / European Journal of Political Economy xx (2005) xxx–xxx 6UNCORRECTED PROOF
ARTICLE IN PRESS
191 communications by central banks greatly vary in their informativeness, so we concentrate on the
192 contents rather than the medium of information disclosure.
193 The informativeness of central bank communications could be assessed from the perspective
194 of the public using financial market responses. However, this makes it hard to identify in what
195 respects a particular central bank is not transparent, because useful information that is not
196 disclosed produces no market reaction. Instead, we focus on the information contents from the
197 perspective of the monetary policy-maker. In particular, we evaluate whether official monetary
198 policy announcements and publications contain explicit information that is relevant for the
199 monetary policymaking process.
200 Our index closely follows the framework discussed in Section 2 and provides a measure of
201 political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency. The subindex for each of
202 the five aspects is based on three questions, which each have equal weight and a maximum score
203 of one. A comprehensive measure of transparency is obtained by the sum of the five subindexes,
204 so it has a maximum score of fifteen. The index covers each of the fourteen items that are
205 organized by aspect in Fig. 1, supplemented by one question that addresses whether there is a
206 published evaluation of the policy outcome based on policy objectives. The Appendix contains
207 the complete description of our index for monetary policy transparency, including the exact
208 questions and criteria that we used.
8
209 The index is constructed for nine major central banks: the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA),
210 the Bank of Canada (BoC), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the
211 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), the Swedish Riksbank (SRB), the Swiss National Bank
212 (SNB), the Bank of England (BoE), and the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed). Resource constraints
213 forced us to consider only a limited number of central banks. We chose the eight central banks
214 that are most important in international financial markets, measured in terms of foreign exchange
215 market turnover of their currencies in April 2001. In addition, we included the Reserve Bank of
216 New Zealand because of its pioneering role in central bank transparency starting in 1989.
217 Our methodology was as follows. First, we sifted through all information published by central
218 banks and other relevant government sources, that was freely available in English as of June
219 2001.
9 Second, for each central bank, we sent the scores we had obtained for that central bank
220 together with the detailed description of the transparency index to a senior official at that central
221 bank (chief economist, or comparable) with the request to review the scores. Third, we used the
222 responses to reassess our scores and made a few modifications.
10 Later on, we updated the index
223 for 2002 and went back to 1998. This methodology is very time consuming, but it has the
224 advantage that it is based on an independent scrutiny of information sources, complemented by
225 the expert feedback from central banks, leading to accurate scores.
11
226 Tables 1 and 2 show the 1998 index and the 1998–2002 increase in the transparency index for
227 each central bank by aspect. The detailed transparency scores for 2002 are presented in Table 3.
9 It is important that all relevant information is not only available in the local language but also in the lingua franca of
international financial markets, English. This language criterion only seems to affect index scores in one instance, given
in footnote 24.
10 We adjusted only 4 out of 135 scores, three of which concerned item 2.a for which publicly available information in
English appeared hard to find for Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. In addition, we found information relevant for item 5.a
at a regional U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.
11 The fact that every central bank claimed to deserve a higher score (up to 5 points extra) underscores the importance of
an independent analysis.
8 The detailed information and sources used to construct the transparency index for each central bank are available in
the Supplementary Data appendix of the unabridged version of this paper (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2004).
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228 We first discuss each aspect of transparency, providing a cross-section overview. Subsequently,
229 we consider the transparency of each central bank in Section 4.
230 3.1. Political transparency
231 All central banks in our sample have formal objectives for monetary policy (1.a). However,
232 Japan, Switzerland, the United States (and Sweden in 1998) do not achieve the full score of one
233 on this item because they have multiple objectives without a prioritization. The latter is
234 important because objectives can be conflicting. The other central banks identify price stability
235 as their main objective.
236 The specification of a quantitative target for the main objective(s) of monetary policy (1.b) is
237 popular. With the exception of the Bank of Japan, (the Swiss National Bank until 1999) and the
238 Federal Reserve, all central banks in our sample have a quantitative target for inflation. This
239 target could be set by the central bank (ECB, SRB, SNB), the government (BoE), or be based on
240 a joint agreement (RBA, BoC, RBNZ).
241 The institutional arrangements between the monetary authorities and the government (1.c)
242 mostly take the form of explicit instrument independence. For several central banks (RBA, BoC,
243 RBNZ, BoE) independence is subject to an explicit over-ride mechanism that specifies a formal
244 (typically restrictive) procedure for the government to overrule the monetary policy decision of
245 the central bank. Although it is sometimes argued that this curtails central bank independence
246 and could affect the incentives of the central bank, an override clause that is explicit does not
t1.1 Table 1
Central bank transparency index, June 1998 t1.2
1998 Index Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total t1.3
Australia 3 1 1 1.5 1.5 8 t1.4
Canada 3 2.5 1 2 2 10.5 t1.5
Euro zone* 3 1 1 1.5 2 8.5 t1.6
Japan 1.5 1 2 1.5 2 8 t1.7
New Zealand 3 2.5 3 1 1 10.5 t1.8
Sweden 2 1.5 2 1.5 2 9 t1.9
Switzerland 1 1 1 2 1 6 t1.10
United Kingdom 3 1.5 3 1.5 2 11 t1.11
United States 1 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 8.5 t1.12
* Euro zone index for 1999. t1.13
t2.1 Table 2
Increase in central bank transparency index, June 1998–June 2002 t2.2
Change in index Political Economic Procedural Policy Operational Total t2.3
Australia 0 +1 0 0 0 +1 t2.4
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 t2.5
Euro zone* 0 +1.5 0 +0.5 0 +2 t2.6
Japan 0 +0.5 0 0  0.5 0 t2.7
New Zealand 0 +0.5 0 +2 +1 +3.5 t2.8
Sweden +1 +0.5 +1 +1.5 +1 +5 t2.9
Switzerland +1.5 +0.5 0 0  0.5 +1.5 t2.10
United Kingdom 0 +1.5 0 0 +0.5 +2 t2.11
United States 0 0 0 +1.5 0 +1.5 t2.12
* Euro zone change in index from 1999 to 2002. t2.13
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247 reduce transparency about the institutional setting. The United States (and initially also Sweden
248 and Switzerland) do not enjoy explicit instrument independence, so they are not awarded the full
249 score of one.
12
250 Many central banks now get the maximum score of three on political transparency, including
251 the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank, the Reserve
252 Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. These are all central banks that
253 have adopted dinflation targetingT, with the exception of the ECB. A particularly interesting case
254 is New Zealand, which clarifies institutional arrangements in the form of a central bank contract
255 called Policy Targets Agreement (PTA). It even allows the government to fire the Reserve Bank
256 Governor if the inflation target is not met.
257 3.2. Economic transparency
258 Theeconomicinformationthatisusedformonetarypolicyincludestimelyeconomicdata (2.a).
259 We looked for the publication of quarterly time-series of five key variables that the academic
260 literatureconsiders importantformonetarypolicy andthatcannotbedirectly observedinfinancial
261 markets: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.
13 The most
262 common reason for not getting the full score is that data on capacity utilization is not disclosed.
12 Nevertheless, the Fed is often thought to enjoy effective independence from the government and Congress. Although
this is not based on formal instrument independence, it could be induced by the anticipation of negative reactions from
Wall Street if the Fed is put under political pressure.
t3.1 Table 3
Index of central bank transparency, June 2002 t3.2
Central bank transparency Australia Canada Euro zone Japan New Zealand Sweden Switzerland UK US t3.3
1. Political 3 3 3 1.5 3 3 2.5 3 1 t3.4
a. Formal objectives 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 t3.5
b. Quantitative targets 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 t3.6
c. Institutional arrangements 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 t3.7
2. Economic 2 2.5 2.5 1.5 3 2 1.5 3 2.5 t3.8
a. Economic data 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t3.9
b. Policy models 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 t3.10
c. Central bank forecasts 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 t3.11
3. Procedural 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 3 2 t3.12
a. Explicit strategy 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 t3.13
b. Minutes 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 t3.14
c. Voting records 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 t3.15
4. Policy 1.5 2 2 1.5 3 3 2 1.5 3 t3.16
a. Prompt announcement 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t3.17
b. Policy explanation 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 t3.18
c. Policy inclination 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 t3.19
5. Operational 1.5 2 2 1.5 2 3 0.5 2.5 1.5 t3.20
a. Control errors 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1 t3.21
b. Transmission disturbances 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 0 t3.22
c. Evaluation policy outcome 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0.5 t3.23
Total 9 10.5 10.5 8 14 14 7.5 13 10 t3.24
13 Although the data may be produced outside the central bank, its release contributes to the transparency of the central
bank’s policymaking. A few central banks claimed they do not use any measures of capacity utilization, but given the
prominence of the output gap in theoretical models they must have some opinion about it to make appropriate monetary
policy decisions.
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270 To interpret the central bank’s policy actions it is important to know what kind of policy
271 models it employs (2.b). An increasing number of central banks have published a structural
272 macroeconomic model that is used for policy analysis; only Japan, Sweden and Switzerland
273 remain deficient in this respect.
274 All central banks release numerical internal forecasts for inflation and/or output (2.c).
275 However, only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England
276 publish medium term forecasts for both inflation and output at quarterly frequency and specify
277 the underlying assumptions about the policy instrument, which we require for the maximum
278 score.
14,15 This requirement is motivated by the fact that inflation and output tend to be the key
279 variables in the determination of monetary policy and that they can only be affected in the
280 medium term (1 to 3 years ahead). In addition, quarterly updates of forecasts are required given
281 that a significant amount of macroeconomic data (including national accounts) are available at
282 quarterly frequency.
283 There has been a significant increase in economic transparency over time (from an average of
284 1.7 in 1998 to 2.3 in 2002). Only two central banks attain the maximum score of 3 on economic
285 transparency, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England. The latter deserves
286 special mention; it provides extensive documentation on its economic models, including the
287 computer code for its macroeconometric model. Furthermore, the Bank of England was the first
288 central bank to introduce fan charts for its internal forecasts of inflation and output, which has set
289 an example for several other central banks.
290 3.3. Procedural transparency
291 Most of the central banks in our sample provide a description of their monetary policy
292 framework intheform ofan explicit monetary policystrategy (3.a). Typically,thestrategyissome
293 form of inflation targeting, although the ECB’s btwo pillar strategyQ is a notable exception. Only
294 the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve do not have an explicit monetary policy framework.
295 Several central banks, in particular the Bank of Japan, the Riksbank, the Bank of England and
296 the Federal Reserve, release a comprehensive account of policy deliberations within a reasonable
297 amount of time (eight weeks) in the form of (non-attributed) minutes (3.b) that also include a
298 discussion of the forward-looking arguments that are so critical for monetary policy.
16
299 These central banks are also the ones that publish individual voting records (3.c).
17
300 Three central banks score full marks on procedural transparency, the Reserve Bank of New
301 Zealand, the Riksbank and the Bank of England. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is special in
302 the sense that its policy decisions are solely made by its Governor. This means that voting
303 records are immaterial. In addition, minutes are substituted by comprehensive explanations of its
16 We do not require the publication of attributed minutes or even verbatim transcripts because they are likely to
discourage open discussion during monetary policy meetings (Buiter, 1999, p. 194).
17 A few central banks told us they decide dby consensusT. However, this term is ambiguous and need not mean
unanimity. In fact, decision making by unanimity would be at odds with many central bank statutes that stipulate
decisions be taken by majority voting.
15 We do not discriminate between conditional vs unconditional forecasts or staff vs policymakers’ forecasts, although
we recognize that these may serve different purposes in the communication strategy. In the absence of certainty
equivalence, risks to forecasts would also be relevant.
14 When the policy instrument is the interest rate, central bank forecasts for both inflation p and output y are generally
needed to identify demand and supply shocks, d and s, and achieve economic transparency (Geraats, 2005). But that
would not suffice when the instrument is the money supply.
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304 decisions, including forward-looking analysis. Although decision-making by committee makes it
305 harder to achieve procedural transparency, the Riksbank and the Bank of England show that this
306 need not be an insurmountable problem.
307 3.4. Policy transparency
308 All central banks make a prompt announcement of their policy decisions (4.a); their operating
309 instrument or target is a short-term nominal interest rate, with the Bank of Japan currently being
310 the only exception. However, there has not always been openness about policy decisions. The
311 Federal Reserve, for instance, only adopted this practice in 1994.
312 Most central banks provide an explanation when they announce their policy decisions (4.b).
313 The Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England do not get the full
314 score because they do not give an explanation after all policy decisions, although they do
315 provide one whenever policy decisions change.
316 The publication of a policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions (4.c) is
317 unusual. The Federal Reserve includes a statement in its policy announcements that reflects its
318 policy tilt, but only since May 1999. The Riksbank also provides a policy inclination since May
319 2002. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand adopts a different approach and provides short-run
320 quarterly forecasts of short-term nominal interest rates, which essentially convey its likely future
321 policy actions. These three central banks get full marks on policy transparency.
18 And the clear
322 increase in the average score on policy transparency (from 1.6 in 1998 to 2.2 in 2002) is mainly
323 the result of significant changes by these central banks.
324 3.5. Operational transparency
325 The implementation of monetary policy could be complicated by two kinds of disturbances,
326 control errors in achieving the operating instrument or target set in the policy decision (5.a) and
327 unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy (5.b).
328 Most central banks in our sample account for significant deviations from the operating target (if
329 any), or have (nearly) perfect control over their main operating instrument. The only exceptions
330 are the Bank of Japan (since March 2001, when it adopted a money target) and the Swiss
331 National Bank (since December 1999, when it adopted a wide interest rate range), which fall
332 short because they do not provide explanations for significant fluctuations around the operating
333 target, thereby getting a score of one-half.
334 Most central banks regularly publish an analysis of current macroeconomic developments or
335 short-term forecasts, which implicitly provide information on trans-mission disturbances (5.b).
336 Nevertheless, two central banks get a score of zero: the Federal Reserve releases its short-run
337 forecastsand macroeconomicanalysisonly semiannually; and theSwiss NationalBank only hasa
338 brief abstract of macroeconomic analysis in English. The Riksbank and the Bank of England both
339 obtainthefullscoreastheyincludeanannualdiscussionofpastforecasterrors,whichisneededfor
340 a complete explanation of the unanticipated factors affecting the transmission process.
341 Finally, we consider whether central banks regularly provide an evaluation of the policy
342 outcome in light of macroeconomic objectives (5.c). Most central banks have some kind of
18 A few central banks suggested that the risks to forecasts they publish indicate a policy inclination. However, it is not
straightforward to map risks to inflation and output forecasts into a policy tilt, especially when they go in opposite
directions.
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347 evaluation without accounting for the role of monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of Australia
348 and the Swiss National Bank are exceptions in the sense that they do not have a regular
349 evaluation. On the other hand, the Riksbank sets a positive example with its explicit annual
350 evaluation in which it discusses the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives,
351 thereby earning the maximum score.
352 All in all, the Riksbank is the only central bank to achieve full marks on operational
353 transparency. Perhaps, it could be a source of inspiration for other central banks, since the scores
354 on operational transparency vary a lot, with the Swiss National Bank getting the lowest score
355 (0.5) for any of the five aspects.
356 The comprehensive index that consists of the sum of the subscores for each of the five aspects
357 reveals which central banks are the most transparent. In 1998, the most transparent central banks
358 were the Bank of England (11 out of 15), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of
359 Canada (both 10.5), followed by the Swedish Riksbank (9), the Federal Reserve (8.5), the
360 Reserve Bank of Australia and Japan (both 8) and Switzerland (6). In 2002, average
361 transparency had increased from 8.9 to 10.7, with major rises in economic and policy
362 transparency. The top league of central bank transparency now consists of the Reserve Bank of
363 New Zealand, the Riksbank (both 14) and the Bank of England (13). The subtop is formed by
364 the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank (both 10.5) and the Federal Reserve (10). The
365 Reserve Bank of Australia (9), the Bank of Japan (8) and the Swiss National Bank (7.5) remain
366 the least transparent central banks in our sample. Table 2 shows that most of the increase in
367 average transparency from 1998 to 2002 can be attributed to greater economic transparency by
368 many central banks and large increases in policy transparency by a few central banks.
369 4. How transparent are central banks?
370 The Previous section provided an overview of each aspect of transparency across central
371 banks. This section complements that view with a description of transparency for each central
372 bank during 1998–2002.
373 4.1. Reserve Bank of Australia
374 Although the Reserve Bank of Australia has adopted inflation targeting, it gets one of the
375 lowest transparency scores (8, increasing to 9 in 2002) in our sample. Although the RBA gets the
376 maximum score on political transparency, its openness on other aspects is much less. Economic
377 transparency falls short because it does not publish quarterly data on capacity utilization and
378 only provides rough short term forecasts for inflation (quarterly) and output (semiannually)
379 without numerical details about the medium term. In addition, there was no explicit policy model
380 until October 2001.
19 Procedural transparency is low as the RBA does not release minutes and
381 voting records. There is also scope for greater policy transparency because of the lack of an
382 explicit policy inclination and a prompt explanation of each policy decision. Regarding
383 operational transparency, the RBA provides neither a discussion of past forecast errors, nor an
384 evaluation of the policy outcome.
385 The Reserve Bank of Australia shows that inflation targeting by no means guarantees
386 transparency in all respects.
19 Although a structural macroeconomic model appears in one of its Research Discussion Papers (2000–2005), it was
not made clear until October 2001 that the Bank uses it for policy analysis.
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387 4.2. Bank of Canada
388 The Bank of Canada, another inflation targeter, secures a place in the subtop of transparency
389 with a score of 10.5. It earns the full score on political transparency, but misses out on complete
390 economic transparency because it only publishes rough projections for inflation and output
391 without full numerical details for the medium term. The BoC has low procedural transparency
392 because it does not disclose minutes and voting records. It does better on policy transparency,
393 although there is no explicit indication of likely future policy actions. For operational
394 transparency the BoC misses full marks for not discussing past forecast errors and not explicitly
395 accounting for deviations of inflation from the target.
396 All in all, the Bank of Canada is quite transparent, but its procedural transparency is low.
397 4.3. European Central Bank
398 Starting of with a relatively low score of 8.5, the European Central Bank has significantly
399 increased its transparency and now belongs to the subtop with a score of 10.5. Although it is not
400 an inflation targeter, it achieves the maximum score on political transparency. For economic
401 transparency the ECB earns high marks, but this is entirely due to recent developments, namely
402 the publication of its euro area model (in January 2001) and its semiannual medium term
403 conditional staff projections for inflation and output (in December 2000). Procedural
404 transparency at the ECB is limited because it does not provide comprehensive minutes and
405 actual voting records. Policy transparency at the ECB has increased a bit as it now provides an
406 explanation of the policy decision at a press conference after each monetary policy meeting, but
407 it still lacks an explicit policy inclination. On operational transparency, there is no discussion of
408 past forecast errors and no explicit account of the contributions of monetary policy in the
409 informal evaluation of policy outcomes the ECB provides.
410 In its early years of existence, the European Central Bank has already achieved quite some
411 transparency in several respects, but there is scope for greater procedural and policy
412 transparency.
20
413 4.4. Bank of Japan
414 The Bank of Japan has one of the lowest transparency scores (8) in our sample. Political
415 transparency is limited because it has multiple objectives of monetary policy without explicit
416 prioritization, and no precise definition or quantification of its objectives. The BoJ has shown
417 some increase in economic transparency. It still does not disclose a formal macroeconomic
418 model used for policy analysis, but since October 2000 the BoJ has published its forecasts for
419 inflation and output, albeit only at semiannual frequency. Procedural transparency at the BoJ is
420 quite high because it publishes elaborate minutes in a timely fashion, including individual
421 voting records, although it lacks an explicit monetary policy strategy. Concerning policy
422 transparency, there is no explicit policy inclination or a prompt explanation of each policy
423 decision. The score on operational transparency of the BoJ has dropped a bit because after
424 changing the main operating target to the outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank
20 This also sheds light on the debate on ECB transparency between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999), which is discussed
by de Haan and Eijffinger (2000).
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429 in March 2001, there have been significant fluctuations without explanations for it.
21 In
430 addition, the BoJ does not discuss past forecast errors or account for deviations between policy
431 outcomes and objectives.
432 The Bank of Japan has recently shown some change in transparency, but its transparency is
433 still limited, most noticeably on political and policy aspects.
434 4.5. Reserve Bank of New Zealand
435 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which has been one of the most transparent central
436 banks throughout our sample, started off with a score of 10.5 in 1998, zoomed ahead to 13 in
437 1999 and subsequently rose to 14 points. The RBNZ is an inflation targeter that has attained
438 the full score on political, economic, procedural and policy transparency. The RBNZ
439 accomplished an impressive increase in policy and operational transparency in March 1999
440 when it altered its monetary policy operating procedures. In particular, it changed its formal
441 policy instrument from the daily settlement cash target, which had not been adjusted for a long
442 time and was hardly mentioned in RBNZ communications, to the Official Cash Rate.
22 But,
443 the RBNZ still misses marks on operational transparency because it does not provide a
444 discussion of past forecast errors or evaluate how monetary policy contributed to policy
445 outcomes.
446 The transparency of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is outstanding, although it is still
447 feasible to increase operational transparency.
448 4.6. Swedish Riksbank
449 The Swedish Riksbank has achieved the largest increase in transparency in our sample.
450 Starting with a modest score of 9 in 1998, the SRB has soared to 14, sharing the top spot
451 with New Zealand. It is also an inflation targeter with a maximum score on political
452 transparency. But the SRB could still increase economic transparency because it does not
453 disclose a formal macroeconomic model that is used for policy analysis. Regarding
454 procedural transparency, the SRB has recently reached the full score, releasing both minutes
455 and voting records.
23 On policy transparency, the SRB also recently achieved the maximum
456 score after it started providing an explicit policy tilt. For operational transparency the
457 Riksbank is the only central bank to gain full marks; since 1999, it provides an annual
458 evaluation of the inflation outcome over the last three years, including a discussion of the
459 role of monetary policy.
460 The Swedish Riksbank has accomplished an impressive increase in transparency. It attains
461 perfect scores on all aspects, except for economic transparency because it does not publish a
462 policy model.
23 In May 2002, the Riksbank clarified that the attributed reservations against the decision included in the minutes
correspond to the only dissents, so that effectively individual voting records are available.
21 Previously, the BoJ had a main operating target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate, with the rate at essentially
zero since February 1999.
22 Instead of focusing on the formal policy instrument, from December 1996 to March 1999 the monetary policy stance
was essentially conveyed in terms of a target for the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), which is a weighted average of
the trade-weighted exchange rate and the 90-day interest rate. In terms of this (intermediate) policy target, policy and
operational transparency in 1998 were much better (3 and 2, respectively).
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463 4.7. Swiss National Bank
464 The Swiss National Bank receives the lowest transparency score in our sample with 7.5
465 points. Political transparency increased significantly in 2000, when the SNB’s independence was
466 enshrined in the constitution and a quantitative definition of price stability was specified. But the
467 SNB still has multiple objectives without an explicit prioritization. On economic transparency,
468 the SNB has published a 3-year forecast for inflation at semiannual frequency since 1999, but it
469 does not disclose a formal policy model. The SNB has low procedural transparency because it
470 releases neither minutes nor voting records. Its policy transparency is higher, although it does not
471 provide an explicit policy inclination. The SNB currently scores very low on operational
472 transparency. Since December 1999 it has had an operational target range for the LIBOR of 100
473 basis points, but it does not provide an explanation for significant fluctuations within that range.
474 Although it provides an elaborate analysis of macroeconomic developments, only a brief abstract
475 is available in English.
24 Finally, the SNB gives merely a review of the year, and it does not
476 account for discrepancies between policy outcome and target.
477 The Swiss National Bank is not very transparent when compared to the other central banks in
478 our sample. There is a lot of scope for greater transparency, especially on the economic and
479 operational aspects.
480 4.8. Bank of England
481 The Bank of England started off as the most transparent central bank in our sample (with 11
482 points) and its subsequent rises (to 13) have kept it in the top of the transparency league. The
483 BoE is an inflation targeter that has attained the maximum score for political, economic and
484 procedural transparency. Its policy transparency is much lower because it does not provide an
485 explicit policy inclination or a prompt explanation after every policy decision. On operational
486 transparency the BoE only misses full marks because there is no evaluation of its policy
487 outcomes that accounts for the contribution of monetary policy.
488 The Bank of England is very transparent and has been used as an example by many other
489 central banks. Nevertheless, there is still scope for greater policy transparency.
490 4.9. Federal Reserve System
491 The total score for the Federal Reserve is 10, securing a place in the subtop. The Fed’s
492 political transparency is low because it has multiple objectives without an explicit prioritization
493 or quantification, and no explicit, formal instrument independence. Economic transparency is
494 quite high, but it only publishes short-term economic projections for inflation and output at a
495 semiannual frequency. Concerning procedural transparency, the Fed does not publish an explicit
496 policy strategy that describes its monetary policy framework. It has earned full marks on policy
497 transparency since May 1999 when it started to provide an explanation and policy inclination
498 with every policy decision. Its lower score for operational transparency reflects the fact that it
499 only publishes macroeconomic analysis at semiannual frequency and only an informal
500 evaluation of policy outcomes.
501 The Federal Reserve has high policy transparency, but its political transparency is noticeably
502 less.
24 If information were not restricted to be in English, the SNB would gain 0.5 point on item 5.b.
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505 These results show that the degree of transparency differs significantly across central banks,
506 even for inflation targeters. In addition, they document significant increases in transparency for
507 several central banks, especially the Swedish Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
508 5. Discussion
509 Central banks have many communication tools at their disposal, ranging from monetary
510 policy reports to press conferences. Since these could greatly vary in their informativeness, it is
511 important to focus on the contents rather than the medium of information disclosure. Our index
512 assesses the disclosure of explicit information based on a theory-consistent framework that
513 emphasizes the role of information in the monetary policymaking process. Each question in the
514 index pertains to a distinct item and thereby avoids direct overlap, although it cannot possibly
515 capture all the different ways in which central bank announcements affect people’s beliefs. For
516 instance, forecasts and voting records could provide clues about future policy actions. And
517 minutes and policy decisions may reveal information about central bank forecasts. However,
518 such inference is indirect and hard to verify, whereas our index directly addresses each item
519 based on specific criteria.
520 Nevertheless, information could be conveyed in several ways and there is clearly some
521 substitutability between different communication tools. For instance, a qualitative description of
522 the economic outlook is likely to enrich economic transparency, although it cannot replace the
523 numerical detail provided by quantitative forecasts. A press conference after the policy meeting
524 could contribute to procedural transparency, but in practice it is a poor substitute for the
525 comprehensive account of deliberations that minutes provide.
25 And more complex ways of
526 conveying monetary policy inclinations could be used instead of a formal policy bias, but in
527 practice they often leave so much leeway for interpretation that they could actually obscure the
528 policy stance. To avoid an exercise in dreading tea leavesT, our index requires explicit
529 information to ensure a certain degree of clarity about each item.
530 While central banks have become increasingly transparent during the last decade, it is
531 important to realize that there may be trade-offs. For instance, although decision-making by a
532 single central banker may make procedural transparency easier to achieve, a committee of
533 central bankers is likely to make better decisions. The publication of voting records enhances
534 transparency but could affect the independence of monetary policymakers (especially in a
535 monetary union like the EMU), although it could also expose political pressures and facilitate
536 accountability. Commitment to a simple monetary policy rule may be highly transparent but it
537 reduces flexibility to respond to unforeseen circumstances. These examples illustrate that some
538 measures that enhance transparency could have significant drawbacks. They also indicate that a
539 proper assessment of the merits of transparency should be conditional on the monetary
540 policymaking process. Clearly, the way transparency is achieved is not irrelevant.
541 In addition, it is questionable to simply add the scores of individual items to obtain the
542 transparency index. This should not be interpreted as perfect substitutability across items.
543 Ideally, the weight of each item is established empirically, but lacking comprehensive empirical
544 evidence and facing equivocal theoretical results, we chose to adopt a uniform prior across
545 transparency items. The most fruitful applications of our index are likely to be those that not just
546 rely on the total scores but exploit the rich data we provide on individual items.
25 The introductory statements at ECB press conferences were sometimes jokingly called dDuisenberg minutesT (named
after the first ECB president), but such labels are immaterial for our transparency criteria spelled out in the Appendix.
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547 Another issue that deserves to be mentioned is the fact that our index is by no means
548 exhaustive. A central bank that obtains full marks need not be perfectly transparent. For instance,
549 the publication of risks to forecasts contributes to economic transparency in the absence of
550 certainty equivalence. And the release of the anticipated forward interest rate path yields more
551 policy transparency than merely providing a policy inclination for the next decision. The score of
552 our index merely indicates that a certain degree of transparency and clarity has been achieved.
553 Nevertheless, our results establish that there has been a remarkable enhancement of the public
554 communication of monetary policy during our sample period, 1998–2002. At the same time,
555 there have hardly been any modifications to formal disclosure requirements in central bank
556 legislation. Instead, central banks appear to have increased transparency in an attempt to improve
557 credibility of their new low-inflation policies. Outside (political) pressure could also have
558 induced greater transparency. For instance, the publication of macroeconomic projections by the
559 ECB was triggered by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European
560 Parliament in its quarterly Monetary Dialogue with the ECB based on Article 113(3) of the
561 Treaty on European Union and following the advice of its Panel of Experts in their quarterly
562 Briefing Papers. In fact, the European Parliament has repeatedly urged in its Resolutions on the
563 ECB Annual Report that the ECB become more transparent by publishing its macroeconomic
564 forecasts, econometric model, minutes and non-attributed voting records.
26
565 Our transparency index focuses on the role that the disclosed information plays in the
566 monetary policymaking process following the framework in Section 2, which makes the index
567 more suitable for an empirical evaluation of theoretical arguments. The empirical literature has
568 started to investigate the macroeconomic effects of central bank transparency. For instance, using
569 cross-section data for 87 countries, Chortareas, Stasavage, and Sterne (2002) find that greater
570 transparency about forward looking analysis is associated with lower average inflation, even
571 after controlling for macroeconomic and institutional characteristics such as central bank
572 independence. However, cross-section empirical studies may be problematic because there has
573 been a considerable increase in transparency that is not uniform across countries, as is shown in
574 Table 2.
27 Geraats and Eijffinger (2004) actually exploit the dynamics in transparency in a time-
575 series analysis and find that increases in the scores of our index tend to be associated with lower
576 short term interest rates, controlling for macroeconomic circumstances.
577 Another strand of the empirical literature focuses on financial market responses related to
578 monetary policy. Examples include Clare and Courtenay (2001), Perez-Quiros and Sicilia
579 (2002), Kohn and Sack (2003), Poole and Rasche (2003), Swanson (2004) and Ehrmann and
580 Fratzscher (2004, 2005). This literature typically equates greater central bank transparency with
581 better predictability of monetary policy. However, it is important to realize that predictability is
582 determined by both transparency and (the absence of) disturbances. So, predictability and
583 transparency need not correspond. For instance, better predictability of monetary policy found in
584 empirical studies could simply be caused by milder shocks to the economy rather than improved
585 public communication. In addition, frequent changes, such as the modifications to the Policy
586 Targets Agreement in New Zealand, could be promptly disclosed, but they are likely to reduce
587 the long-run predictability of monetary policy.
27 For instance, Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2002) consider the correlation between our transparency index and the
mean and variance of inflation and output, but in the unabridged version of this paper (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2004)w e
show that their results are not robust.
26 See European Parliament Resolutions A5-0035/1999, A5-0169/2000, A5-0225/200, A5-0220/2002 and A5-0237/
2003.
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588 In practice, monetary policy is never completely predictable. This raises the question to what
589 extent central banks could become more transparent, which is an issue that our index helps to
590 address.
591 6. Conclusion
592 This paper presents a transparency index for monetary policy that is based on the disclosure of
593 information relevant for the monetary policymaking process. Our index gives rise to some
594 interesting conclusions. The most transparent central banks are the Reserve Bank of New
595 Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England. The subtop is formed by the Bank of
596 Canada, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. The least transparent central banks
597 in our sample are the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank.
598 Although the most transparent central banks in our sample are all inflation targeters, there is
599 remarkable variation in overall transparency among central banks that have adopted inflation
600 targeting. For instance, the Reserve Bank of Australia gets one of the lowest scores. It is striking
601 that the inflation targeters all achieve the maximum score on political transparency, which
602 describes openness about objectives, quantitative targets and institutional arrangements.
603 However, inflation targeting is not a necessary condition for political transparency, as is
604 exemplified by the European Central Bank.
605 It should be noted that our analysis of the various aspects of central bank transparency is
606 designed to be independent of the monetary policy framework and does not seem to be biased
607 towards inflation targeters, given the large variation within this category. In principle, other
608 monetary policy strategies, like monetary targeting or the ECB’s two-pillar strategy, could all
609 obtain the maximum score for any aspect of transparency.
610 Our analysis shows that central banks put different emphasis on the various aspects of
611 transparency. For instance, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve both achieve the
612 same overall score on transparency in 2001. But the ECB has its strength in political
613 transparency, whereas the Fed excels in transparency about its policy decisions in the form of a
614 prompt announcement, explanation and policy inclination. Perhaps, this explains why financial
615 markets perceive the Fed as more transparent than the ECB.
616 Furthermore, we find that central bank transparency exhibits important dynamics. The scores
617 for several central banks have increased significantly over time, especially for economic and
618 policy transparency, and most notably for the Riksbank. This suggests a general trend towards
619 greater transparency.
620 Last but not least, this paper provides an index of transparency of monetary policy that
621 systematically distinguishes between various aspects of transparency based on the role the
622 disclosed information plays in the policymaking process. This makes it well-suited to evaluate
623 the theoretical literature on transparency and to assess to what extent central bank transparency
624 really matters.
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635 Appendix A
636 This appendix contains the exact formulation of the central bank transparency index. The
637 index is the sum of the scores for the answers to the fifteen questions below (min=0, max=15).
638 Note that all questions pertain to published information that is freely available in English.
639 (1) Political transparency
640 Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a formal
641 statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals, a
642 quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.
643 (a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit
644 prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
645 No formal objective(s)=0.
646 Multiple objectives without prioritization=1/2.
647 One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority=1.
648 (b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)?
649 No=0.
650 Yes = 1.
651 (c) Are there explicit institutional arrangements or contracts between the monetary authorities
652 and the government?
653 No central bank, contracts or other institutional arrangements=0.
654 Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract=1/2.
655 Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract (although
656 possibly subject to an explicit override procedure)=1.
657 (2) Economic transparency
658 Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy.
659 This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central bank employs to
660 construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based
661 or judgmental) that the central bank relies on.
662 (a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available?
663 The focus is on the release of data for the following five variables: money supply, inflation,
664 GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.
665 Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables=0.
666 Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables=1/2.
667 Quarterly time series for all five variables=1.
668 (b) Does the central bank disclose the formal macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy
669 analysis?
670 No=0.
671 Yes = 1.
672 (c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
673 No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output=0.
674 Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than quarterly
675 frequency=1/2.
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676 Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term (one
677 to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument (conditional or
678 unconditional forecasts)=1.
679 (3) Procedural transparency
680 Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. It involves an
681 explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy framework, an
682 account of policy deliberations and how the policy decision was reached.
683 (a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its
684 monetary policy framework?
685 No=0.
686 Yes = 1.
687 (b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or
688 explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time?
689 No, or only after a substantial lag (more than 8 weeks)=0.
690 Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or explanations
691 (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward- and forward-looking
692 arguments=1.
693 (c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating
694 instrument or target was reached?
695 No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks)=0.
696 Non-attributed voting records=1/2.
697 Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker=1.
698 (4) Policy transparency
699 Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions. In addition, it includes an
700 explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy
701 actions.
702 (a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target promptly
703 announced?
704 No, or after a significant lag=0.
705 Yes, at the latest on the day of implementation=1.
706 (b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions?
707 No=0.
708 Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially=1/2.
709 Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments=1.
710 (c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or
711 an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)?
712 No=0.
713 Yes = 1.
714 (5) Operational transparency
715 Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions. It
716 involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and (unanticipated)
717 macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the
718 evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is
719 included here as well.
720 (a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if
721 any) have been achieved?
722 No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0.
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723 Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations=1/2.
724 Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control over
725 main operating instrument/target=1.
726 (b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic
727 disturbances that affect the policy transmission process?
728 No, or not very often=0.
729 Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic
730 developments (at least quarterly)=1/2.
731 Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually)=1.
732 (c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its
733 macroeconomic objectives?
734 No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency)=0.
735 Yes, but superficially=1/2.
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